How do nancial crises shape the set of acquirers, how much they acquire, and how long they keep ownership? To address these questions, we develop a tractable model of M&As whereby acquirers and targets emerge endogenously due to di erences in liquidity. Financial crises lead to selection e ects among acquirers that result in larger acquired stakes and more persistent ownership. We present evidence consistent with the predictions of the model in a dataset of domestic and cross-border M&As from emerging markets. Financially constrained domestic rms in crisishit countries acquire 11-15% more ownership. The survival rate of these acquisitions is 19-24% higher.
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented growth in the global market for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) both within countries and across borders. For emerging market economies (EMEs) in particular, annual growth rates of the numbers of domestic and cross-border acquisitions over 1990-2014 averaged about 23.5% and 14.5%, respectively. The growth of this global marketplace -in which rms that face di erent degrees of nancial constraints interact -has not been continuous but has typically varied with the occurrence of nancial crises.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows this phenomenon succinctly by plotting the number of domestic and cross-border acquisitions in a sample of sixteen emerging market economies (EMEs) in each year from 1990-2014. It also shows for each year the proportion of those transactions that occurred during a national nancial crisis, a rough measure of the degree to which target rms were exposed to nancial shocks (the variable labelled "crisis exposure"). Domestic acquisitions in EMEs slowed down during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (as noted in Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016) , only to experience a sharp increase in the latter part of the sample, which coincided with an absence of nancial crises in these EMEs. At the same time we see that cross-border M&As in those countries, conducted mostly by rms from developed markets, experienced a slowdown in relative terms during the Great Recession.
Recent work has demonstrated the importance of nancial factors in general (Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth, 2011; , and nancial crises in particular as drivers of M&As (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b; Weitzel, Kling and Gerritsen, 2014; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016) . However, this literature, in the case of EMEs, has mostly analyzed cross-border M&As in these markets by developed market rms. The vibrant domestic market for corporate control in EMEs, and the underlying mechanisms by which it reacts to aggregate nancial shocks, thus remain relatively understudied. While of interest in itself, the domestic market for corporate control in EMEs is also a natural setting in which to investigate the more general question of how nancial constraints shape the market for corporate control by both altering the set of target rms in need of liquidity, as well as impinging upon an acquiring rm's acquisition decision. The second aspect too has received scant attention because most cross-border acquisitions in EMEs are conducted by rms from developed nancial markets whose nancial constraints do not bind as tightly. Our paper addresses these questions by analyzing the e ects of nancial crises on two metrics commonly studied in the literature: the ownership structure chosen in an M&A and the rate of divestiture. An extensive prior literature, both theoretical and empirical, has shown that both ownership structure and its evolution over time are key determinants of a number of rm level variables. 1 It is therefore important to understand if, and how, nancial constraints and crises a ect these 1 Examples include agency costs (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000) , the degree of technology transfer (Hanousek and Kočenda, 2017) , value gains from an acquisition (Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) as well as their distribution between the target and acquirer shareholders (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) , and the incentives of the rm's owners to apply their technological or management resources (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) . By extension, the dynamics of the ownership structure of a rm exerts in uence on the evolution over time of a number of the above variables, as well as being informative about the performance of the acquisition itself (Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994; Lee and Madhavan, 2010) . Number of acquisitions 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Fraction acquired 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Domestic acquisitions .4
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1 Proportion majority 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Proportion full 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Domestic acquisitions The variable measuring crisis exposure is the percentage of rms in our sample in a particular year that are exposed to a national nancial crisis. A national nancial crisis is de ned as the occurrence of a banking crisis in a country in a particular year. To identify systemic banking crises, we use the dataset constructed by Valencia (2010, 2012) , covering the period 1970-2011. Since it only covers years up to 2011, we use "The Little Data Book on Financial Development" from the World Bank which updates Laeven and Valencia's dataset until 2013, and for 2014, we use online searches of news reports to identify any banking crisis that occurred in a target country. From 2007 to 2014, none of the 16 countries in our sample appear to have experienced a systemic banking crisis. Data on number of acquisitions and fraction acquired are from the SDC Platinum database.
metrics. The main conclusion of our analysis is that, over the business cycle, nancial constraints induce selection e ects among acquirers that fundamentally in uence these two metrics.
Our paper has two main contributions, one empirical and one theoretical. Empirically, we nd that both ownership structure chosen and subsequent divestiture decisions react strongly to nancial crises in the case of domestic M&As in emerging markets. As a preview of our later econometric results, panels (b)-(d) of Figure 1 show the average ownership patterns in domestic and cross-border on average buy larger shares of rms by acquiring majority or full stakes during nancial crises in their own countries; cross-border stakes, starting from about the same averages pre-crisis, appear to increase as well, but not by nearly as much. We show later that, on average, these crisis-time domestic acquisitions are also signi cantly more persistent, while this is not the case for cross-border acquisitions. These facts together present a puzzle: Why do domestic and cross-border M&As, which tend to look similar in normal times, diverge during times of crisis? Our empirical contribution is to thoroughly document these facts about domestic and cross-border acquisitions using a large panel of EME transactions. For reasons explained later, our baseline estimates span the period 1990-2007, but we show that these patterns generalize to more recent years.
Our second contribution is to develop a simple analytical framework in which these empirical patterns arise as a consequence of selection e ects in the market for corporate control. In our model, both nancially constrained and nancially unconstrained acquirers engage in M&As in a setting of nancial underdevelopment. All rms in the nancially underdeveloped economy face borrowing constraints. Some of these rms exit because they lack su cient liquidity to operate. Other rms with more internal nancial resources and su cient borrowing capacities can step in to buy their assets and thus prevent liquidation. We label these acquisitions "low-value" acquisitions because they take place even in the absence of synergies -either technological or management-relatedbetween the two rms. "High-value" acquisitions, in contrast, involve those acquirer-target matches that are expected to be pro table due to synergies and independent of the target's liquidity position.
In this framework, we study the implications of an aggregate negative nancial shock that tightens the borrowing constraints of all rms in the economy, including potential domestic acquirers, but excluding potential foreign acquirers. Throughout our analysis, we contrast the behavior of domestic acquirers, who are subject to the nancial shock, to the behavior of foreign, nancially unconstrained acquirers in order to highlight the role of nancial constraints in a rm's acquisition decision.
From the targets' side, we rst show that a negative nancial shock tends to raise the share of low-value, purely liquidity-driven acquisitions in the total number of acquisitions simply because a larger proportion of potential target rms face liquidity shortages. This rst channel has been studied before (see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016) and drives the acquisition dynamics of foreign, nancially unconstrained acquirers in our model. For domestic acquirers, who are also subject to the nancial shock -in contrast to most of the theoretical literature -our model highlights a second, counteracting channel based on nancial frictions on the acquirer's side: Since an acquisition with higher expected gains from synergies relieves the joint, forward-looking borrowing constraint of the acquirer-target pair, an aggregate nancial shock that tightens nancial constraints for both acquiring and target rms will result in only the highest synergy acquisitions taking place. This leads to proportionally more acquisitions with real value gains (high-value acquisitions) undertaken by domestic acquirers in times of aggregate nancial stress.
This selection e ect is our key theoretical result that we break down into two parts: First, we show that under certain assumptions about the distribution of rms and the type of borrowing constraints, these two e ects perfectly cancel out for the subset of domestic acquirers: Financial crises do neither a ect the relative share of low-and high-value domestic acquisitions nor their composition, but lead to more low-value acquisitions among foreign acquirers. Second, the selection e ect implies that, among domestic acquirers, only the most liquid rms will be able to undertake acquisitions during nancial crises. These two results have important implications for the two metrics of interest in our paper: the ownership structure chosen in an M&A and for how long an acquiring rm keeps its ownership shares before reselling them. We therefore augment our model to generate two main predictions in these readily observable metrics that we then take to the data.
First, to study the e ect on the share acquired in an M&A, we augment our model with a feature that is consistent with recent evidence from emerging market acquisitions: Higher value acquirertarget synergies are associated with larger, possibly controlling, or full stakes acquired in target rms.
This could be due to the presence of intangible assets in a setting of imperfect contract enforceability as in Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) , local inputs in the production process as in Alquist et al. (2018) , or the mitigation of agency problems as in Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011b) . Coupled with our result on the relative shares of low-and high-value acquisitions during nancial crises, foreign acquirers are expected to acquire smaller stakes and be less likely to complete majority or full acquisitions during nancial crises, whereas average shares acquired by domestic rms should not be a ected by nancial crises, or could even go up, depending on the strength of the selection e ect.
Second, the selection e ect leads to opposite predictions for domestic and foreign acquirers regarding the persistence of ownership stakes, i.e. the rate at which acquisitions are divested. We augment our model by an additional time period in which rms can resell assets acquired in the initial, nancial-crisis period. In our model, divestiture rates vary with aggregate conditions for two reasons. First, when the matches between acquirers and targets are low-value and liquidity-driven, they are reversed as soon as aggregate conditions improve. This leads to larger " ipping" rates in the aftermath of nancial crises. This channel, which we call "normal" ipping, has been emphasized so far in the literature by papers such as Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011b) and Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) . The selection e ect introduced in our model changes this prediction for domestic acquirers that face nancial frictions: Acquirers may also divest acquisitions when they themselves run into liquidity problems at future dates, a channel that we call "forced" ipping. The selection e ect implies that, among domestic acquirers, only the most liquid rms will be able to undertake acquisitions during nancial crises. These rms -assuming some persistence in rm liquidity across periods -are less likely to run into liquidity problems at future dates and therefore be forced to divest. Thus, while ipping rates should go up in the aftermath of nancial crises for foreign rms, they will increase less or might even go down for domestic rms. Note that this channel, once again, works exclusively through a selection e ect of having relatively more liquid acquirers in the crisis cohort of constrained acquirers, rather than any changes in individual rm-level ipping decisions.
The empirical literature so far has mostly focused on identifying the e ects of nancial frictions on the target side. In contrast, our interest lies in trying to carefully distinguish between these and the e ects of acquirer-side frictions. However, since an aggregate shock hits all rms, i.e., both acquirers and targets, a simple empirical comparison between the ownership structures chosen by acquirers during crisis versus normal times, as well as the subsequent divestiture rates of the crisis cohort of acquisitions, will in general confound the e ect of the crisis on acquirers with that of the e ect of the crisis on targets. For example, suppose that we observe an increase in the size of stakes acquired by domestic acquirers. This could be driven by constrained acquiring rms seeking value-increasing majority stakes, or alternatively, by constrained targets being sold at re-sale prices.
Hence, we explicitly adopt a di erence-in-di erence strategy in deriving predictions from the model that we then test in the data. Since foreign acquirers from developed markets face the same pool of target rms as the domestic acquirers, yet do not face the e ect of the crisis themselves, the di erential e ect of the crisis on the ownership structures chosen by foreign versus domestic acquiring rms, as well as any such double di erentials in divestiture rates, should be informative about the e ect of the crisis on nancially constrained acquirers. This idea forms the basis of our main theoretical predictions, and informs the design of our empirical analysis. Using developed market acquiring rms as a benchmark group is also motivated by a practical consideration: While the argument above shows that a proper counterfactual is needed to isolate the e ects of acquirerside constraints, there does not exist rm-level measures of nancial constraints for most of the EME acquirer or target rms in our sample, to the best of our knowledge.
In particular, we next test our two theoretical predictions that: (i) the average share of equity acquired by constrained (domestic) acquirers, as compared to unconstrained (foreign) acquirers should rise during nancial crises, driven by an increase in majority or full acquisitions; and (ii) the divestiture rates for domestic acquisitions should be relatively lower for the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions (in relation to unconstrained foreign acquisitions).
For our empirical tests we use Thompson-Reuters SDC data for about 28,000 domestic and crossborder M&As in sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control in emerging economies, focussing on the pre-2008 sample. The choice of sample period is guided by the need to have a nancially unconstrained group of foreign acquiring rms, which arguably is the case only for the period before the Great Recession. Due to the structure of our hypotheses, which involve comparisons of two kinds of acquisitions (relatively nancially constrained and unconstrained acquisitions, proxied by those made by domestic and foreign acquiring rms, respectively), across two macroeconomic regimes (normal times and adverse nancial shocks, the latter proxied by the plausibly exogenous occurrence of country-speci c banking crises), we employ a di erence-in-di erence approach. Using linear regressions and survival analysis techniques, we nd strong evidence in favor of all the main predictions of the model. In particular, we nd that nancially constrained domestic rms in the crisis-hit country acquire between 11-15% more ownership and are 15-18% more likely to take majority stakes than their unconstrained foreign counterparts. Such ownership is also more likely to be persistent: The survival rate of a domestic acquisition is between 19-24% higher in the crisis cohort. We nd that these empirical results are robust to a battery of checks that include, among others, alternative denitions of aggregate nancial shocks, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables to control for normal business cycle variation in acquisition activity, di erent xed e ects combinations, and non-linear estimation procedures. While our preferred estimates are for the 1990-2007 period, including data till 2014 does not change our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section brie y reviews the literature and outlines our contributions. Section 2 lays out a theoretical model of M&As, and derives some testable hypotheses that we take to the data in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper builds on a recent literature on the nancial determinants of M&As, and in particular, the ndings of Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) and Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) . Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) show that when a key motivation of mergers is to reallocate nancial resources from liquid to illiquid rms, pledgability issues may make it optimal for high net worth rms to use discretionary credit lines to nance mergers. They also provide empirical evidence in favor of such a role using a sample of domestic deals from the United States. In contrast to Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) our theoretical focus is on the choice of ownership, its evolution, and the aggregate implications of selection e ects, while our empirical analysis uses domestic and cross-border deals from emerging markets. Our work also builds on Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) , who look at so-called re-sale foreign direct investment in a model where all target rms are credit constrained and all acquiring rms are unconstrained. In contrast to their paper, we develop a more general, yet tractable framework in which all rms, acquirers or targets, may be nancially constrained, with important consequences. In addition, our empirical emphasis is on the response of nancially constrained domestic rms, and as such, we use foreign rms only as a benchmark group of unconstrained acquirers to isolate the e ects of acquirer versus target nancial constraints. 2 2 Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) emphasize the industry composition of acquisitions. In their model matches between rms in the same industry are more productive and nancial crises lead to more inter-industry acquisitions. Our approach in this paper is more general in that we do not assume any particular industry patterns in the gains from acquisitions. In addition, Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) only model the decision of an unconstrained foreign acquiring rm since their focus is on foreign direct investment. Earlier research (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b) focused on the surge of foreign acquisitions and a concurrent decline in domestic acquisitions and portfolio investment during crisis episodes in emerging economies, as well as the relationship between acquisition In related work, provide evidence that both foreign and domestic acquisitions ease nancial frictions in target rms in a large sample of European acquisitions. They nd that the investment levels of the target rms increase signi cantly following an acquisition.
These ndings are consistent with our assumption that part of the gains from acquisitions arise out of acquirers relaxing the borrowing constraints of the targets. Other recent papers such as Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) and Wang and Wang (2015) also document similar nancial gains from acquisitions. From an empirical point of view, while domestic divestitures have been widely studied using US data (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Bergh, 1997) , and for foreign acquisitions in emerging markets (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016) , few papers have focused on documenting and explaining this phenomenon for the large set of domestic acquisitions in emerging markets, as we do. More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on M&As that seeks to explain speci c characteristics of acquirer-target matches, for example, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008b) , who build and test a model of assortative matching in M&As based on rm valuations.
Last but not least, the main mechanism in our paper is a selection e ect based on rm-level liquidity and the value gains from an acquisition. The latter can take many forms, including an increase in productivity or wages in the acquired rm. Hence, our paper also speaks to a large literature in macroeconomics that deals with the cleansing e ect of recessions, i.e. the process by which the least productive rms in the economy are forced to exit during a recession, leading to aggregate e ects on productivity. 3 This literature, however, has generally ignored the existence of the market for corporate control where distressed rms may be acquired. In the concluding section we therefore discuss some implications of our results for macroeconomic models that analyze the allocative e ects of aggregate shocks. prices and rm liquidity. For example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) note that rm level liquidity was a better predictor of the probability of a foreign acquisition than the probability of a domestic acquisition in the tradable good sector during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. Weitzel, Kling and Gerritsen (2014) investigate the relationship between aggregate conditions, and the number of cross-border transactions and asset prices in the case of Europe and do not nd evidence in favor of signi cantly nancial frictions at work during crises. Stoddard and Noy (2015) , in a study using UNCTAD data on FDI volumes, also do not nd evidence of re-sale FDI.
3 This literature has explored several mechanisms in connection with the cleansing e ect, related to labor markets (Caballero and Hammour, 1996) , entrepreneurial credit constraints (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994) , and the contribution of new producers' productivity advantages and entry (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008) . Here, the closest paper to ours is Osotimehin and Pappadà (2015) , who look at how credit constraints in uence the cleansing e ect of recessions in a theoretical model of rm dynamics. In a similar vein, our paper is also related to the literature that studies the reallocation of capital and other resources over the business cycle. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) explore the procyclicality of capital reallocation among rms, and the apparent countercyclicality of the bene ts from reallocation. Their analysis suggests that the cost of capital reallocation needs to be strongly countercyclical to rationalize the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion. Cui (2014) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model where partial capital irreversibility generates delays in capital reallocation during periods when credit conditions are tighter and lowers aggregate productivity. A recent strand of this literature uses disaggregate data to quantify resource misallocation during crises. Ober eld (2013) and Sandleris and Wright (2014) provide evidence from the 1982 Chilean economic crisis and the 2001 Argentine crisis, respectively, of a decline in the e ciency of resource allocation within and across sectors during these crises. These papers, however, do not address the question of reallocation of capital across rm boundaries through the M&A market.
A Model of Selection E ects in M&As
This section presents a simple model where nancially constrained rms can become targets of acquisitions, and acquire other rms themselves if they have enough resources. This model is based on simpli ed versions of the models studied in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) that we extend to include domestic, constrained acquirers.
Two-Period Model Setup
The economy is populated by a continuum of rms. Firms in the baseline version of the model last for two periods 0 and 1, and di er in their expected gross pro ts in period 1. Firms borrow in period 0 to nance their production in period 1 and are able to pledge a certain fraction of their expected gross pro ts to take out loans.
A Firm's Problem Without Acquirers
To produce in period 1, all rms have to pay an upfront cost, b. Firms di er in their expected period 1 (gross) pro ts, y i , which is i.i.d. across rms. Here, i indexes a particular rm and we think of this rm as a potential target of an acquisition. We later introduce the subscript j to index potential acquirers. We assume that y i > b for all i so that all rms prefer production to non-production.
Firms' initial endowment is 0, so that rms have to take out a loan to pay for the upfront cost b. Firms are restricted in the loan size they can take out. In particular, the loan size cannot exceed a certain fraction τ of gross expected pro ts:
b ≤ τ y i .
(2.1) So τ measures the degree of credit frictions in the economy, which we assume to be the same across all rms. 4 In an economy without credit frictions, τ = 1, whereas τ = 0 implies that rms cannot borrow to pay for the upfront costs. One can interpret τ as a measure of the maximum 'debt-to-value' ratio because b corresponds to a rm's debt, and y i is a rm's expected pro ts that is available to pay o the debt. 5 When we later discuss the e ect of nancial crises on acquired shares and divestiture rates, we model nancial crises through changes in τ .
If a rm lacks the capacity to pay for the upfront cost -that is if y i < b τ -it cannot produce in the second period and the value of the rm is 0. These rms either immediately exit the market or 4 We choose a common τ across all rms to avoid introducing too many dimensions of heterogeneity because our interest lies in aggregate gures such as the average acquired share across all rms. In earlier versions of this paper, we considered di erences in a rm's initial endowment and a rm's borrowing constraint. Adding these dimensions did not deliver any additional results and we therefore dropped them for the sake of a more parsimonious model. 5 The form of the borrowing constraint captures a common prediction from models of limited contract enforcement: The amount of credit is limited by the borrower's expected pro ts. That is, the debt limit is forward-looking, as e.g. in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) or Kehoe and Perri (2002) . This forward-looking feature of the debt limit is a crucial element of our model. An alternative would be to model credit frictions through borrowing constraints that restrict the amount of debt to a borrower's current wealth (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011, for example) . Brooks and Dovis (2013) provide an empirical analysis of these two types of credit frictions and nd evidence in favor of the forward-looking debt limit, which we adopt here. become targets of acquisitions. Market exit of this kind can be interpreted as ine cient liquidation of the rm since the rm would always prefer production to non-production. If a rm's expected pro ts are high enough, it can secure a loan and produce, which raises its value by the expected pro t net of the upfront costs, y i − b. These rms can stay in the market as stand-alone entities, can be targets of acquisitions or can be acquirers themselves. The total value of a (potential target) rm i can then be summarized as
(2.2)
We now discuss the acquisition problem of potential acquirers, indexed by j.
Acquisition Decision and the Target's Financial Position
Any pair of rms, denoted by i for a target and j for an acquirer, from the population described above can potentially meet in the market for corporate control. We assume that i and j are randomly matched in this market. 6 As soon as they are matched, they draw a synergy parameter net of acquisition costs, φ i,j , which is i.i.d. across matched pairs and assumed to be strictly positive. When a rm acquires a target, the target rm produces next period and its expected net pro ts y i − b change by the factor φ i,j . The value of an acquired target rm i to an acquirer j is then
Note that φ i,j can potentially be less than unity, which implies that acquisitions can be value-destroying, net of the costs of acquiring (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005 ). An acquisition takes place under two conditions: i) its surplus is positive and ii) it is feasible. Note here that while we do not explicitly model the process by which acquiring rms search for targets, the matching process described is quite general in that it does not make any assumptions about which rms (say based on size, productivity, Tobin's Q etc.) end up in a match, except that they draw a stochastic match quality parameter.
The surplus is the di erence between the value of the acquired rm after and before the acquisition, i.e. V acq i,j − V tar i :
(2.4) 6 We believe that many mergers are the result of (directed) search processes, as e.g. emphasized in Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008a) among others. We chose, however, to keep di erences between constrained (domestic) rms and unconstrained (foreign) rms to a minimum and therefore abstract from directed search. Our model emphasizes the relevance of (economy-wide) borrowing constraints in shaping the distribution of acquisitions. Unless search frictions are directly a ected by changes in borrowing constraints, we believe that our model's results are very general and would still be present in a model with search frictions. In a similar vein, we also maintain the assumption that all rms have access to the same set of target rms. We have experimented with restricting the pool of target rms for foreign rms to only include large rms. Our results are not a ected by this setup because they are based on a di erence-in-di erence approach that cancels out these long-term di erences between acquirers.
Figure 2: Acquisitions
Notes: Shows the range of values for the target's net pro ts, y i , that de ne low-and high-value acquisitions for acquisitions during normal and crisis periods. These ranges are φ −1 i,j ≤ y i ≤ b τ for low-value and y i ≥ φ −1 i,j for high-value acquisitions, with the subscript on the τ indicating (n)ormal or (c)risis periods, and φ −1 i,j being the inverse of the function de ned in equation (2.5) solved for y i . Figure 2 shows the zero-surplus line S = 0 as a function of the synergy parameter φ i,j and the target rm's expected pro t y i . We denote the levels of φ i,j that solve S cons = 0 and S uncons = 0 by φ lo and φ hi :
For φ i,j > φ hi = 1, an acquisition always generates positive surplus because the net bene ts from the resulting technological synergies are positive. This is true irrespective of the target rm's pro ts y i and the tightness of the borrowing constraint. These acquisitions occur in the region above the line F F . We refer to them as "high-value" acquisitions. If the two rms draw a synergy parameter φ lo ≤ φ i,j < φ hi = 1, technological synergies are not su cient to make an acquisition pro table.
However, if the target rm is nancially constrained (i.e. its expected pro ts are too low, y i < b τ ), so that the rms would be otherwise liquidated, an acquisition generates additional bene ts from relaxing the borrowing constraint of the target and is therefore pro table. Firm pairings with φ lo ≤ φ i,j < φ hi and y i < b τ (within the rectangular area ABCF ) are therefore pro table, and are referred to as "low-value" acquisitions.
Firms in the region to the bottom left of ABC are forced to exit because they cannot pay the xed cost of operating in period 1, yet their realized φ i,j with the acquirer they have been randomly paired with is too low for an acquisition to be pro table. The rms to the right of C CF remain standalone entities or become acquirers themselves: Neither are they nancially constrained, nor have they drawn a φ i,j high enough (>1) for them to be acquired on the basis of technological synergies alone.
Acquisition Decision and the Acquirer's Financial Position
The previous section describes how the surplus generated from an acquisition depends both on the synergies it creates and on the nancial position of the target rm. However, besides generating a positive surplus, an acquisition also has to be feasible. This depends on the acquirer's nancial position.
Financially Constrained Acquirer. Acquirers with low realizations of y j are potentially constrained. Like their targets, they face borrowing constraints, which reduces their ability to perform acquisitions. As a consequence, some acquisitions that would generate a positive surplus do not take place because the acquirer himself lacks the liquidity to nance the acquisition.
Since the acquirer as well as the target are nancially constrained, we need to consider both of their borrowing constraints and keep track of both of their expected net pro ts post-acquisition, which are y j and φ i,j y i , respectively. Generally, the borrowing constraint for the post-acquisition entity states that total upfront costs, 2b, cannot exceed some value 2τ
(2.5)
Here, the function B, together with τ , determines this upper limit, which we assume to positively depend on both the acquirer's pro ts, y j , and the target's post-acquisition pro ts, φ i,j y i . Assuming that this function is invertible in φ i,j y i , it is convenient to denote the minimum values for φ i,j and y i that satisfy this borrowing constraint as φ i,j (y i , y j ) and y i (φ i,j , y j ). We also refer to this joint borrowing constraint as a feasibility constraint in the context of an acquisition.
The impact of this feasibility constraint on acquisitions is illustrated in Figure 2 . In addition to the synergy cut-o s that characterize the set of points where acquisitions are pro table (for a given y j , the area on the φ i,j − y i plane bounded below by ABCF in Figure 2 ), there is now an additional downward sloping curve XX describing the joint borrowing constraint of the target rm and the acquirer. XX shows the minimum target's expected pro ts, y i , for each φ i,j (or the minimum synergy level φ i,j at each level of y i ) that makes acquisitions feasible, given an acquirer's expected pro ts, y j , and aggregate nancial conditions, τ . For a given φ i,j of a match, only acquisitions to the right of XX can potentially take place, even if they are pro table, because the acquirer himself faces nancial constraints. The negative slope of the XX can be understood as follows. Because low φ i,j acquisitions have lower expected pro ts, the feasibility constraint is tighter for these acquisitions.
These acquisitions therefore need larger target rm expected pro ts, y i , to make them feasible. The acquirer's expected pro ts, y j , and aggregate nancial conditions, τ , act as "shifters" for the XX curve. For acquirers with higher expected pro ts y j , the curve XX shifts down and lowers the cuto value of the synergy parameter φ i,j . For high enough y j the curve XX crosses point A, so that the impact of the acquirer's nancial constraint is no longer felt. A higher τ has an analogous e ect on XX . Figure 2 illustrates that the feasibility constraint restricts the mass of both low-and high-value
acquisitions that a constrained acquirer can actually complete upon being matched with a target. For an acquisition by a constrained rm to take place, the following two conditions have to be met: i) it generates positive surplus, i.e., φ i,j ≥ φ hi for productive targets y i ≥ τ b , and φ lo ≤ φ i,j < φ hi for less productive targets y i < τ b and ii) both rms together have enough resources to pay for their upfront costs, which can be expressed using the feasibility constraint as y i (φ i,j , y j ) ≥ y i . Based on these conditions, the mass of low-and high-value acquisitions are 7
where F , G j and G i denote the distributions of φ i,j , y j and y i . Starting from the innermost integral, the limits of integration refer to the relevant ranges of the gross pro ts of the target rm, the gross pro ts of the acquiring rm, and the synergy parameter of the acquisition.
Limiting Case: Unconstrained Acquirer. When an acquirer's pro ts tend towards in nity, y j → ∞, he does not face any borrowing constraints (as long as τ > 0), so that acquisitions are always feasible and take place whenever they generate a positive surplus, i.e. whenever S ≥ 0. For this set of unconstrained acquirers, denoted by an asterisk, the mass of low-and high-value acquisitions are
where F and G i denote the distributions of φ i,j and y i . In Figure 2 , these sets of acquisitions correspond to the area above ABCF .
Financial Crises and the Average Acquired Share
In this section, we ask whether an aggregate nancial shock to the economy, modeled as a decrease in τ from τ n to τ c , a ects the average ownership structures observed in the market for corporate control. We start by de ning these average acquired shares. For constrained rms, it is denoted byα and can be expressed as the weighted sum of the average shares of low-and high-value acquisitions, α lo = α lo n lo andα hi = α hi n hi , with the weights being the share of these two types of acquisitions in the total number of unconstrained acquisitions:
where ω = n lo n lo +n hi 8 . The equivalent expressions for the average shareα * acquired by unconstrained
Before proceeding further, we make an assumption about the relationship between ownership structures and the synergies parameter. In particular we assume that the share acquired α i,j is increasing in the synergy parameter φ i,j associated with the acquirer-target pair
We remain agnostic about the reasons for this positive relationship. It could be that rms acquire larger shares of targets in expectation of stronger technological synergies, or that larger acquisition shares lead to strong synergies, or both. Both of these forces would arise in contracting models of joint ventures (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) or acquisitions (Alquist et al., 2018) when owners co-invest in inputs. Such a relationship could also arise due to majority control facilitating the transfer of intangible assets as in the large literature in international trade on rm boundaries (see Antràs, 2003; Antràs, Desai and Foley, 2009) , or due to non-technological reasons when controlling stakes resolve agency issues in target rms as in Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011b) . 10 Thus, while synergies arising endogenously in the model could be an interesting extension, it would dilute the focus of the analysis, which is on selection e ects. The assumption is also natural in the context of EMEs, where Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) nd that acquisitions of majority (≥ 50%) stakes are associated with positive abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average. 11 Our assumption implies that low-value acquisitions 8 The average shares for low-and high-value acquisitions by constrained acquirers are given by:
τ αi,jdGdF and α hi * ≡ φ hi αdF denote the sum of acquired shares in low-and high-value acquisitions. Note that with yj → ∞, the expressions for these averages do not need to include the integrals over yj.
10 Suppose an acquirer expects exogenously larger value gains from an acquisition. The acquirer will then take a larger equity share in order to retain a higher share of the surplus from the acquisition. In the case that the value gains endogenously arise from the provision of inputs such as intangible capital, management or knowhow, the acquirer might choose a larger stake to commit to providing such inputs optimally. Our model does not analyze these various motives and trade-o s that acquirers and targets face when choosing an optimal degree of ownership. Instead, we want to highlight a di erent force, in particular, shifts in aggregate nancial conditions, that a ect the average acquired share observed in the cross-section of acquisitions. Any changes in the average acquired share that we analyze later on will therefore be driven by changes in the composition of the pairs of rms for which an acquisition is successful. 11 Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) use an event-study methodology in a sample of acquisitions of emerging market (EM) targets by both developed market (DM) and emerging market (EM) acquirers. While gains exist for both DM-EM and EM-EM acquisitions, they are found to be higher for the former. The gains appear to be associated with the transfer of intangible assets from acquiring to target rms, since the e ect is larger in weaker contracting environments and for rms in industries with high asset intangibility.
We now ask how an aggregate nancial shock di erentially a ects the share acquired by constrained rms compared to the share acquired by unconstrained rms. Focusing on the di erential lets us capture how nancial constraints of the acquiring rms shape the aggregate e ect of the shock.
Since the shock a ects both acquirers and targets in reality, the di erencing cancels out the component of the shock that works through the nancial constraints of targets alone. 12 Speci cally, we look at the derivative ∂(α−α * ) ∂τ , whereα andα * are as de ned in equations 2.9 and 2.8, and τ is the parameter governing aggregate nancial conditions. Our later empirical test of the model follows this analysis closely, using a di erence-in-di erence strategy.
To gain insight into the derivative ∂(α−α * ) ∂τ , it is useful to decompose the above derivative using the expressions forα andα * in equations (2.9) and (2.8), as follows:
(2.10)
While the magnitudes of some of the individual components depend on speci c assumptions regarding the distribution of expected pro ts, G, and the joint borrowing constraint, B i,j , the decomposition above is quite general. Hence it is instructive to examine the components in more detail. The rst row refers to changes in the share of low-value acquisitions, ∂ω/∂τ and ∂ω * /∂τ (for constrained and unconstrained acquirers respectively), also called the extensive margin. The second row, the intensive margin, refers to the changes in the average acquired share for each subgroup of low-and high-value
acquisitions.
The extensive margin di ers substantively for constrained and unconstrained acquirers: For unconstrained acquirers, the negative nancial shock increases the share ω * of low-value acquisitions (region BCDE in Figure 2 ) as a larger proportion of potential target rms nd themselves unable to raise enough external debt nancing to cover the upfront cost of operating in the second period, and thus face liquidation. Coupled with our assumption that α (φ i,j ) > 0, this implies a decline in the average share coming from this channel. For constrained acquirers, this e ect is counterbalanced by a second e ect: A nancial shock also tightens the joint borrowing constraint, shifting the Figure 2 ) and making it harder for rms to acquire targets. This dampens the increase in the share of low-value acquisitions because some low-value acquisitions cannot take place as acquirers nd themselves unable to raise su cient funds. Importantly, this shift in the joint-borrowing constraint can, under certain conditions, disproportionately a ect low-value acquisitions. Borrowing constraints skew the distribution of acquired rms further towards acquisitions with higher synergies. Some low-synergy acquisitions that might still be prof- 12 Most of the literature on M&As has focussed on the implications of nancial constraints on the side of the target rm, see for example , Wang and Wang (2015) , Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) , and Alquist et al. (2018) . One exception is Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) , who consider the optimal nancial policy of potentially constrained acquiring rms. In contrast, we focus on the aggregate selection e ects driven by acquirers' nancial positions.
itable, suddenly become infeasible if neither the target nor the acquirer has enough liquidity. This aggregate extensive margin for constrained acquirers depends on the distribution of expected pro ts in the economy, G, as well as the precise form of the joint borrowing constraint, B i,j . 13
The intensive margin does not react to the aggregate shock in the case of unconstrained acquirers.
Since the mass and composition of their high-value acquisitions are una ected by the nancial crisis, the average acquired share within that group does not change, i.e., ∂α hi * ∂τ = 0. The crisis leads to an increase in the mass of low-value acquisitions, but this increase is independent of φ i,j , so that the average acquired share of low-value acquisitions remains constant, i.e., ∂α lo * ∂τ = 0. For constrained acquirers, the sign and magnitude of the intensive margin depends on which rms are a ected more by the shift of the borrowing constraint, i.e., on G and B i,j .
Hence to pin down the extensive and intensive margins for constrained acquirers, we make further assumptions regarding G and B i,j . We assume that G is Pareto, and that B i,j is multiplicative in the expected pro ts of both acquirer and target. We specify and discuss these assumptions extensively in the appendix. In the following proposition we rst analytically prove that under these assumptions the acquired share of constrained rms, relative to that of unconstrained rms, should rise in response to an aggregate tightening of nancial constraints.
Proposition 1 Increase in relative acquired shares of constrained rms during crises
Under Assumptions 1 through 3 (listed in the appendix), the shares acquired by constrained rms relative to the shares acquired by unconstrained rms become larger during nancial crises, i.e. if τ c < τ n then α c −α * c >α n −α * n .
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The proof of the proposition, detailed in the appendix, works by determining the sign and magnitude for each of the components of equation 2.10 separately:
(2.11)
First, for unconstrained acquirers, as explained earlier, the extensive margin lowers the average share acquired, while the intensive margin does not react to a change in τ. This happens irrespective of distributional assumptions. Second, for constrained acquirers, for Pareto-distributed G, the magnitude of the two counteracting extensive margin e ects described earlier -the increase in the potential 13 Technically, this disproportionate e ect on low-value acquisitions requires a positive second derivative of the joint borrowing constraint (2.5) with respect to τ and yi. In Figure 2 , this e ect is illustrated through a larger rightward shift of the joint borrowing constraint towards higher yi for smaller values of φi,j. It also depends on Gi, the distributions of yi, in particular its second derivative. As we emphasized, whether the share acquired by constrained rms remains exactly constant eventually depends on the rm pro t distribution G and the joint-borrowing constraint B i,j . The key of this section was to provide intuition about the two counteracting forces that determine the observable average ownership structure chosen for constrained acquirers, and to delineate the assumptions under which we can assign an unambiguous sign to their net e ect. In a later section we simulate the model numerically and nd that under certain plausible conditions, the decrease in the feasibility to complete low-value acquisitions actually dominates the increase in the low-value target pool, and as a result, the average share by constrained acquiring rms even goes up in the aftermath of an aggregate nancial shock. Thus, we will use the decomposition provided by equation (2.10) and Proposition 1 as a simple benchmark case to guide and interpret our empirical implementation later.
Three-Period Model Setup
The analysis so far has been static. To study the e ect of a nancial shock on the dynamics of ownership, we now allow for the possible resale of rms after an acquisition. We show that the selection e ects based on technological synergies and liquidity that in uenced average ownership structures might also in uence post-acquisition ownership dynamics. In particular, we show that in the presence of asset sales driven by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to the owner of the asset, an aggregate nancial shock leads to the selection of liquid acquirers into the market for corporate control, thereby lowering asset ownership turnover. In this section we brie y outline the steps used to solve the dynamic (three-period) version of the model and provide intuition behind the main results.
Detailed statements and proofs of the underlying propositions are relegated to the appendix. We extend the model in the previous section by an additional period, period 2. When we later analyze the e ects of nancial crises on divestiture rates, we model period 1 as a crisis period with tighter borrowing constraints and period 2 as a "normal" period, where nancial conditions have returned to their previous state. In period 1, after pro ts for that period have been realized, the acquirer j receives an all-or-nothing o er for her entire share of the rm that was purchased in period 0. We make two main assumptions to simplify the analysis substantially: (i) every prospective seller in period 1 can nd a new acquirer to buy back his initial period 0 acquisition, and similarly, every target rm that was not acquired in period 0 can nd a new acquirer in period 1; and (ii) the new acquirer making the buy-back o er operates the rm using the same technology as the original owner of the rm (i.e. φ i,j = 1). These two assumptions together allow for a simple diagrammatic analysis of the resale decision. 14 In the static model, acquisitions occurred simply on the basis of pro tability and feasibility. However, since resale of the asset involves comparing the payo from the resale to the payo from retaining ownership of the asset, we need additional assumptions on the division of the surplus from an acquisition as well as the stochastic process of pro tability in periods 1 and 2. These latter assumptions -Nash bargaining between acquirers and targets over surplus and an autoregressive process for pro ts -are relatively standard and are discussed in the appendix.
While the exposition and analysis of asset resales can be found in the appendix, we brie y discuss our main results and the intuition behind them in the following paragraphs. In period 1, it is optimal for the initial acquirer j to resell the rm i whenever the value of reselling exceeds the value of holding onto the rm. The resale value depends on the expected net pro ts from production in period 2 for the new acquirer who makes the o er to buy. The value of holding onto the rm depends on the expected liquidity position of the post-acquisition entity (i.e. the acquirer-target entity resulting from the period 0 acquisition), since this entity will become nancially constrained at the end of period 1 with some probability, and thus be unable to produce.
Resales then happen under two circumstances. First, all initial acquisitions that were driven by pure liquidity provision (low-value acquisitions) get resold because the target rm no longer requires liquidity for production in period 2. For ease of exposition we call these "normal ips". Under our assumptions, this is the case for φ i,j < φ hi = 1. This type of ipping occurs even if the post-acquisition entity is liquid enough to produce in period 2. Second, even some high-synergy acquisitions with φ i,j ≥ φ hi = 1 might get ipped. This happens whenever the post-acquisition entity becomes liquidity-constrained at the end of period 1. We refer to this type of ipping as "forced ipping".
The probability of forced ipping coincides with the probability of the post-acquisition entity not having enough liquidity, conditional on having had enough liquidity in the rst period. Since unconstrained acquirers have enough liquidity by de nition, forced ipping is only relevant for constrained acquirers.
We can now combine the period 1 resale decision with the initial period 0 acquisition decisionthe details of which are in the appendix -to obtain ve cases, illustrated in Figure 5 . No acquisition takes place in cases 1 and 3 because synergies are too low. In case 1, the target rm exits the market because it lacks liquidity to pay for the upfront cost of production; in case 3, the target rm has 14 The assumption that every target rm that was not acquired in period 0 can nd a new acquirer implies that the outside options for target rm and acquirer at the end of period 1 are the same and therefore do not a ect the surplus of the initial acquisition. This assumption together with the assumption that the new acquirer has φi,j = 1 keeps the relevant acquisition cuto s φ lo and φ hi the same as in the static model. One can relax the assumption that sellers nd a buyer with certainty. Reducing this probability is similar to introducing a discount factor. This being said, it is true that these assumptions are less innocuous if we believe that parameters are changing over the business cycle. For example, the probability of nding a buyer or the potential outside o er can change over the business cycle. These extensions might give use additional insights on ipping behavior, but we believe that they are orthogonal to the mechanism discussed in this section. Note that we no longer require the assumption that the acquired share α positively depends on the synergy parameter φi,j.
Figure 3: Resale of Acquired Firms
Notes: Figure displays combinations of the synergy parameter φ i,j and the expected pro ts y i,1 of a target rm, which can be initially acquired and then resold (' ipping'). The joint borrowing constraint φ i,j is drawn for a constrained acquirer with a given liquidity level y j,1 . For cases 2 and 4, only rms with φ i,j ≥ φ i,j are acquired. See text and appendix for further details on the di erent cases. enough liquidity to produce by itself, but the synergies are too low to justify an acquisition. These two cases coincide perfectly with the corresponding cases ("exit the market" and "not acquired/potental acquirer") in Figure 2 . This is a consequence of the simplifying assumptions (i) and (ii) noted at the beginning of this section. Case 2 gives rise to low-value acquisitions that will be ipped at the end of period 1 with certainty, as discussed above. Finally, cases 4 and 5 comprise combinations of φ i,j and y i,1 , where initial acquisitions take place, but those high-value acquisitions might be ipped at the end of period 1 if the acquirer is constrained and realizations of second-period pro ts are low.
Financial Crises and Asset Resales
We now ask how nancial crises a ect asset resales among acquisitions. We compare ipping rates for acquisitions at the end of period 1 under two scenarios. In scenario 1, all periods are normal periods with τ 1 = τ 2 = τ n . In scenario 2, the nancial crisis occurs at the end of period 0, but is over by the end of period 1, i.e. τ 1 = τ c < τ 2 = τ n . Flipping, or divestiture, rates are de ned as the number of acquisitions ipped at the end of period 1, n f lip over the number of total acquisitions made at the end of period 0, n.
From our discussion above (and as proved in the appendix), unconstrained acquirers only ip low-value acquisitions (normal ips), so that their ipping rate is simply
where ω * is the share of low-value acquisitions. In contrast to unconstrained rms, constrained acquirers might, in addition, be forced to ip some of their high-value acquisitions:
( 2.12) where ω is the share of low-value acquisitions and p is the share of high-value post-acquisition entities that have enough liquidity at the end of period 1 (out of the total mass of high-value post-acquisition entities). The mass of asset resales for constrained acquirers is thus made up of a mass ω of "normal" ips and a mass (1 − p)(1 − ω) of "forced" ips.
We now ask how an aggregate nancial shock di erentially a ects the ipping rates of acquisitions made by constrained rms compared to those by unconstrained rms. As with the acquired share, focussing on the di erential e ect lets us capture any change in divestiture rates that work through the nancial constraints of the acquiring rm alone. To understand the intuition behind this result, it is instructive to look at the derivative, with respect to τ 1 , of the di erential ipping rate:
We examine each of the terms on the right hand side of the expression above in turn. The last term is the response of the divestiture rate of unconstrained rms to a negative nancial shock in the economy. Since unconstrained rms only ip low-value acquisitions, the change in the proportion of ipped unconstrained acquisitions is simply equal to the change in the share of low-value acquisitions in all acquisitions by unconstrained acquirers. This, as shown earlier, increases (i.e. ∂ω * ∂τ 1 < 0) when there is an adverse aggregate nancial shock (i.e. decline in τ 1 ) due to more potential target rms requiring liquidity.
The rst two terms show the response of constrained rms and suggest two di erences relative to the case with unconstrained acquirers: The rst term shows the changes in the share of low-value acquisitions that get ipped. A main insight from Proposition 1 in Section 2.2 was that this share of low-value acquisitions does not change for constrained acquirers during crises due to two counterbalancing e ects. This keeps ipping rates low. Here it should be noted that there being no change in "normal" ipping rates for constrained acquirers is a knife-edge result that rests on the distributional assumptions we made. Hence in the next section we will attempt an empirical assessment of the size of this e ect.
The second term refers to changes in the number of "forced" resales caused by acquirers running into liquidity problems. As emphasized in Section 2.2, only rms with large expected pro ts can raise su cient funds to undertake acquisitions during nancial crises. To the extent that rms' expected pro ts are somewhat persistent, it is less likely that these rms will face liquidity problems in the aftermath of the nancial crisis, which will reduce the ipping rates for acquisitions made by constrained acquirers during nancial crises. 15 The lower ipping rates observed for crisis-cohort acquisitions are therefore the result of a double "selection e ect" stemming from the acquirer's side: Only the highest-synergy acquisitions (i.e. large φ i,j ) take place, and only the most-liquid rms (i.e. large y j,1 ) acquire targets. In the following empirical section, we directly test Proposition 2 using a di erence-in-di erence approach. In addition, since the proposition holds only under particular distributional assumptions, we also attempt to empirically determine the signs and magnitudes of the three terms discussed above.
Model Versus Data
In this section we compare the predictions of the model with the data as follows. We rst simulate the model in Section 3.2 to obtain the shares acquired by constrained and unconstrained rms under normal and crisis periods. We do so under di erent parameter values, some of which are calibrated to the data. We then describe and motivate our di erence-in-di erence empirical framework and use it to analyze this simulated data, as well as its empirical counterpart, in Section 3.3. This enables a direct comparison of the model with the data, as well as the estimation of certain empirical marginal e ects that we deliberately leave out of the model to simplify and focus the analysis.
Data Description
We take the model to the data using transaction level data for domestic and cross-border M&As from the Thompson-Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum database. SDC contains information on the universe of such deals in a large set of EMEs. We only include sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control in EMEs that had signi cant activity in the M&A market over the entire sample period: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Singa-pore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. 16 For each transaction, we utilize a few key variables: the share of a rm acquired in an acquisition and owned after an acquisition, the names of the rms involved, both their primary two-digit SIC industry classi cations, the country of the acquirer and target rm, and the date on which the transaction was completed. In all our empirical estimations, we use the sample of acquisitions in which 10% or more of a rm is acquired. This is done to keep our results comparable to the literature on FDI, since, as explained below we use foreign acquisitions as a comparison group. This leaves us with a sample of 28,109 transactions.
As explained in more detail shortly, we adopt a di erence-in-di erence strategy where we identify unconstrained acquiring rms with foreign acquirers from developed markets and constrained acquiring rms with domestic acquirers in EMEs. While large domestic rms in EMEs that face only very loose nancing constraints could also be considered as unconstrained, this empirical strategy is guided by a key data limitation: To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist rm-level data on size or nancial constraints for most of the EME acquirer or target rms in our sample. Hence we rely on cross-border acquisitions in EMEs by developed market rms as the comparison group. This is a reasonable approximation because the vast majority of foreign acquiring rms in our sample are from countries with more well-developed nancial markets, not other EMEs. 17 
Calibrating and Simulating the Model
This section describes the calibration of the model in Section 3.2.1, and the simulation results for acquired shares (Section 3.2.2) and ipping rates (Section 3.2.3).
Calibration
We simulate the model to analyze the reaction of the average acquired share and ipping rates to a tightening of the borrowing constraint. We rst have to choose functional forms and parameters.
Some of these parameters are chosen to match certain features of the data on emerging market acquisitions described above.
We rst normalize the xed cost / debt parameter b to 1. The borrowing constraint parameter, τ , corresponds to the maximum debt-to-value in our model. We choose τ = 0.75 during normal times and τ = 0.6, translating into a 25 percent decline in the maximum debt-to-value ratio. In the analytical section, we had assumed a joint borrowing constraint where the two rms' expected pro ts are neither substitutes nor complements. This was partly done for analytical convenience.
In our simulation, we show that our results from the analytical section are robust to an alternative, and perhaps more natural, assumption that banks consider acquirer's and target's expected pro ts as perfect substitutes:
Under this formulation banks consider only the value of the joint acquirer-target entity when extending loans. It would be quite easy to extend the analysis using CES-type functional forms to allow for di erent degrees of substitutability between acquirer's and target's collateral.
For the distribution of expected pro ts, y i , we choose a log-normal distribution. 18 Several studies have found that both log-normal and Pareto distributions capture reasonably well the distribution of sales and employment. For example, Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ranciere (2011) estimate that a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter close to, but above 1 captures the size distribution of rms across many countries. The distribution of sales is closely linked to the distribution of productivity and pro ts. For instance, in a model with monopolistic competition (see Melitz, 2003 , for example), the shape parameter for the sales distribution is simply the elasticity of substitution between the products of rms less the shape parameter of the productivity distribution. Assuming an elasticity of substitution around 6, a shape parameter for the productivity of 5 is consistent with the evidence on the size distribution. We use a log-normal distribution for productivity instead of a Pareto distribution and choose its parameters to match the mean and the variance of a Pareto distribution with scale parameter 1 and shape parameter 5. 19 We have less guidance on the distribution of synergies, φ i,j , which captures the technological bene ts from an acquisition net of the costs of acquisitions (such as those stemming from restructuring, legal fees etc.). We assume a normal distribution with mean 1, which means that half the rm pairs draw synergy parameters that lower the net productivity of the target rm. There is a considerable body of literature in nance that documents value-destruction in M&As (see for example Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005) , as well as value gains for shareholder of both acquiring and target rms (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) . Our assumption of a normal distribution takes both these cases into account. We assume that the acquired share is a function of the synergy parameter 20
The form for the acquired share function ensures that the acquired share is between 0 and 1 and increasing in φ i,j . Recall that we provided an extensive discussion about the assumption of a continuous and positive relationship between α i,j and φ i,j in Section 2.2. The parameters ψ 0 , ψ 1 and the standard deviation of the distribution of φ i,j together a ect the distribution of acquired shares.
As the elasticity ψ 1 increases, the acquired share is more sensitive to synergies φ i,j , so that small variations in φ i,j lead to strong variations in α i,j . Since we have to restrict α i,j to be between 0 and 1, an increase in ψ 1 raises the share of full acquisitions. The parameter ψ 0 strongly a ects the number of acquisitions below 50%. A higher value for ψ 0 lowers the share of acquisitions below 50%. Finally, the standard deviation of φ i,j determines the shape of the acquired share distribution. As it increases, acquired shares α i,j are more and more uniformly distributed.
We choose ψ 0 and ψ 1 and the standard deviation of the synergy distribution to match as best as possible the fraction of acquisition below 50%, the fraction of full acquisitions, and the average acquired share that we observe in the data. Table 1 compares acquired shares in the data and the model. We cannot perfectly match the three moments: Whereas the fraction of acquisition below 50% is almost identical in model and data, the fraction of full acquisitions is somewhat larger in the data compared to the model, although the average acquired share is smaller. The reason for the discrepancy is that the model does not feature many small scale acquisitions with shares of less than 30%, which can be observed in the data. However, the t is fairly good for our very parsimonious model. 21
Simulated Average Acquired Shares
Figure 4(a) shows how the average acquired share of both unconstrained and constrained acquirers adjusts to a steady decline of the maximum debt-to-value ratio, τ , in our 2-period model from Section 2.2. During normal times the average acquired share is somewhat higher among constrained rms (0.76 vs. 0.68). As credit constraints tighten, we observe that this gap widens by almost 7 percentage points, in line with Proposition 1. This widening is driven both by a decrease of the average acquired share for unconstrained acquisitions (by 4 percentage points) and an increase for constrained acquirers (by almost 3 percentage points). Recall that under the speci c assumptions underlying Proposition 1, the average acquired share for constrained acquirers stays constant instead of going up. Its precise movement particularly depends on the range of τ and the form of the joint borrowing constraint, and even though the share might even go down for constrained acquirers, we never found a combination of parameters for which it went down more than it did for unconstrained acquirers. 
This decomposition follows equation (2.10). The extensive margin captures the composition e ect of a change in the average productivity of low-and high-value acquisitions. The intensive margin refers to changes in the average productivity of the two types of acquisitions. Figure 4(b) shows the result of this decomposition for a change in τ from 0.75 to 0.6, both for the net e ect (constrained less unconstrained), and for unconstrained and constrained acquirers individually. The net increase in the gap of 7% stems to two thirds from the extensive margin. This strong extensive margin is mainly driven by unconstrained acquirers. For acquisitions undertaken by constrained acquirers, this composition e ect actually ips. Most of the increase in the average acquired share stems for an increase within each type of acquisitions.
Simulated Flipping Rates
An additional parameter of our three-period model, that we did not need in the two-period calibration discussed in Section 3.2.1, is the persistence of the temporary productivity, ρ. There is little guidance in the literature on this parameter, but it is probably uncontroversial to assume some persistence. We set ρ = 0.5, which, if we think of one period in our model corresponding to roughly four years, is in line with an annual persistence of about 0.85. Note that our results remain robust even for ρ = 0. 
Regression Analysis of Average Acquired Share and Flipping Rates
To provide empirical evidence on the acquirer nancial constraint channel, we now adopt the same di erence-in-di erence (DID) strategy that formed the basis of Propositions 1 and 2 in the model section.
Average Acquired Share: Empirical Strategy, Hypotheses and Results
Following Proposition 1 we rst estimate the magnitude of the di erential e ect of the crisis on ownership shares acquired by domestic and foreign acquiring rms. For easy interpretability of the coe cients we use a simple OLS speci cation as our baseline speci cation. Results using a Generalized Linear Model (to take into account the bounded nature of our dependent variables) are similar and can be found in the appendix. We rst estimate the parameters of the following equation to nd the overall or total e ect of the crisis on ownership shares:
The dependent variable in this regression, f racacq kjct , is the fraction of the target rm acquired in a transaction ("fraction acquired"). The subscripts k, j, c, and t stand for transaction, single-digit SIC industry of the target rm, target country, and time, respectively. The two main independent variables are D ct C , which indicates whether an acquisition took place during a period when there was an aggregate adverse nancial shock in the target country ("Crisis"), and D kjct F , which indicates whether the acquirer involved in a particular transaction is from a developed market ("Foreign"), which proxies for unconstrained acquirers in our theoretical model. Our crisis dummy D ct C is de ned using the (annual) systemic banking crises dates from Laeven and Valencia (2010) . The vector con of independent variables used as controls includes xed e ects (at the country×target-industry level in our baseline speci cations) and a set of lagged country-level macroeconomic variables, varying at the country×year level. The motivation behind these control variables are discussed at length later.
Brie y, the xed e ects control for time invariant factors at the country×target-industry level (for example, that particular industries in particular countries might have unique ownership structures due to regulations), while the macroeconomic variables correct for normal business cycle variation in M&A activity. Since our main explanatory variables are binary, the baseline group in the above regression, as well as all subsequent ones, is identi ed by setting D ct C = 0 and D kjct F = 0, simultaneously, which is the subset of domestic acquisitions during normal times.
Next, we decompose the total e ect into an extensive and an intensive margin, as in the theoretical model. For identifying the extensive margin empirically, we estimate the following regression:
where the dependent variable is a dummy D kjct maj. that takes a value of 1 above some threshold of ownership ("majority"). Recall that the extensive margin in the model (see Proposition 1) refers to changes in the shares of low-value acquisitions (∂ω/∂τ and ∂ω * /∂τ for constrained and unconstrained acquirers, respectively). Furthermore, we argued earlier -based on the empirical ndings of Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) and Alquist et al. (2018) -that changes in ω and ω * should translate into changes in average ownership structures. Thus the empirical counterpart of extensive margin changes in ownership structure is a compositional shift towards majority (Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) or full acquisitions (Alquist et al., 2018) . In our baseline estimations, we set the threshold of ownership beyond which acquisitions are high-value in EMEs to be 50% based on Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) .
To estimate the intensive margin, we use a speci cation identical to equation 3.3 in all respects, except that we include a dummy independent variable identifying a majority acquisition:
The idea behind this speci cation is that part of the marginal e ects on acquired shares captured in the parameter estimates of equation 3.3 might be driven by changes in the prevalence of majority acquisitions (i.e. the extensive margin) during crises. This part of the e ect is captured by the "majority" dummy D maj . The coe cient β Int. C,F then captures the remaining e ect, that is the e ect driven by changes within the group of non-majority (1%-49%) acquisitions and within the group of majority acquisitions (50%-100%).
Based on Proposition 1 and the earlier discussion, we frame a key empirical hypothesis regarding the coe cients associated with the dummy variable interactions D ct C × D kjct F in equations 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
Hypothesis 1 Financial crises have di erential e ects on ownership structures chosen by domestic and foreign acquirers. Speci cally, crises should have a larger e ect on domestic stakes in comparison to foreign stakes during crisis times, i.e., β T ot. C,F < 0. This is driven by both extensive and intensive margins, i.e., β Ext. C,F < 0 and β Int. C,F < 0.
The crisis e ect for domestic acquisitions is β C and those for foreign acquisition is β C +β C,F . We expect the crisis e ect to di er for domestic and foreign acquisitions, since the latter are presumably una ected by local credit conditions. In particular, we expect the crisis e ect to be larger for domestic acquisitions, i.e., β C + β C,F − β C = β C,F < 0. This, in turn, is driven by changes along an extensive margin (relative decline in the share of high-value acquisitions for foreign acquirers), and an intensive margin (relative decline in stakes acquired within the category of low and high value acquisitions for foreign acquirers).
We estimate the three regressions (equations 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5) by OLS, using our EME data (Panel A of Table 2 ) and using simulated data from the theoretical model (Panel B of Table 2 ). Columns
(1)-(3) of both panels of Table 2 correspond, respectively, to equations 3.3 -3.5, and form our baseline results. The column headings indicate which of the margins described above ("Tot. " for Total, "Ext. "
for Extensive and "Int. " for Intensive) the coe cients correspond to. First, in qualitative terms, note from Panel A that we nd strong empirical support for our key hypothesis: We nd in column 1 that the crisis e ect is larger for domestic acquisitions than foreign ones (β T ot. C,F < 0, Hypothesis 1). We nd in columns 2 and 3 that the estimates for the extensive margin (−0.09) and the intensive margin (−0.02) are both of the correct sign and statistically signi cant (at the 1% and 5% level, respectively).
The estimated e ects are also large quantitatively. During normal times, both domestic and foreign rms acquire on average about a 65% share in their targets, while roughly 65% of their acquisitions comprise majority acquisitions in which at least 50% of a target is acquired. Starting from no statistically signi cant di erences during normal times (as indicated by the zero coe cients on D F in column 1 of Panel A) there is a divergence in the share acquired by 7 percentage points (pp.), driven by an increase of about 5 pp. (signi cant at 1%) for domestic acquirers and a 2 pp. decline (signi cant at 5%, calculation not shown) for foreign acquirers. Stated di erently, domestic and foreign rms acquire roughly similar shares during normal times, while domestic rms acquire about 11% more ownership during banking crises. The divergence in the likelihood of completing majority acquisitions is even larger, about 15%. 22 Columns 1-3 together suggest that the mechanisms highlighted by our theoretical analysis -that of an extensive margin compositional shift towards high-value majority acquisitions (β Ext. C,F in column 2) and a selection e ect along the intensive margin (β Int. C,F in column 3) -are signi cant determinants of the divergence in ownership between constrained domestic acquiring rms and unconstrained foreign rms captured by β T ot. C,F in column 1. 22 It should be noted that these baseline estimates form a lower bound in that they control for macroeconomic conditions and xed e ects. Table B .1 in the appendix, which is discussed later, shows the results without these controls. According to these estimates, while domestic and foreign rms acquire roughly similar shares during normal times, domestic rms acquire about 15% more ownership during banking crises and are about 18% more likely to complete majority acquisitions. Notes: The table reports the point estimate of the coe cient associated with the banking crisis dummy β C , foreign acquisition dummy β F and their interaction β C,F obtained from an OLS estimation on the SDC dataset (Panel A) and simulated data (Panel B). For both panels, the precise speci cations in columns 1-3 are as follows. Column (1) corresponds to equation 3.3; column (2) corresponds to equation 3.4; column (3) corresponds to equation 3.5. Column (4) is an alternative of the speci cation in column (2) with the dependent variable de ned on the basis of a dummy variable that is 1 when 100% of a rm is acquired in an acquisition. Column (5) estimates the speci cation in column (1) on the subset of acquisitions in which less than 100% of a rm is acquired. Conceptually, it is a counterpart of the speci cation in column (3). See the text of the paper for detailed explanations. a, b and c indicate statistical signi cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All columns in Panel A have macroeconomic controls and country×target-industry xed e ects, the coe cients of which are omitted from the table to conserve space. Table 2 also highlights the bene ts of our DID approach: The DID crisis e ects, which compares the crisis e ect on constrained (domestic) acquirers to the crisis e ect on unconstrained (foreign) acquirers, are 7 pp., 9 pp. and 2 pp. for the total e ect, the extensive margin and the intensive margin, respectively. In comparison, the coe cients β T ot. C = 0.05, β Ext. C = 0.06 and β Int.
in Panel A of Table 2 , which only compare domestic rms between crisis and normal times, are smaller in magnitude. 23 Thus, not taking into account the e ects of the change in the pool of target rms during nancial crises -which in our estimates is captured by the comparison to a baseline of unconstrained foreign acquirers -underestimates the e ect that acquirer-side nancial constraints have on ownership shares.
To compare the model's predictions to the empirical results in quantitative terms, we present in Panel B of Table 2 the coe cients from identical estimations performed on a data set with a total of 300,000 observations simulated using the procedure outlined in the previous section. For completeness we report the same set of statistics in Panels A and B, such as the number of observations and standard errors. However we focus only on the point estimates of the coe cients from the simulated data. 24 Looking at column 1, Panel B, we see that the simulated crisis leads to an increase of the share acquired by domestic acquisitions of 3 percentage points, but a decrease for foreign acquisitions by 4 percentage points, implying again a gap of 7 pp., as in the data. Note that these numbers are consistent with the simulation results conveyed in Figure 4 . The predicted signs and magnitudes of the coe cients are remarkably similar in the simulated and actual data for such a parsimonious model. 25
Decomposing the e ect into an extensive and intensive margin (columns 2 and 3), we nd that the intensive margin plays a somewhat more important role in the simulated data than the actual data. 26 23 An alternative way to estimate the crisis e ect on domestic acquirers alone is by dropping all the foreign acquisitions from our data and running the following two regressions on the subset of acquisitions made by domestic acquirers only: This leads to point estimates (results not shown) of β T ot. C = 0.04, β Ext. C = 0.06, and β Int. C = 0.005. i.e., 4 pp., 6 pp. and approximately 1 pp. changes in the total, extensive and intensive margins. 24 The point estimates are e ectively the coe cients from a linear approximation of the data generating process implied by the theoretical model, and are meant to provide a sense of the quantitative performance of the model. We do not have data that would let us precisely calibrate all the stochastic processes used in the simulations, for example, the variance of rm-speci c idiosyncratic shocks. Since these in uence all the objects estimated in the regression with the simulated data, we do not compare all the estimated statistics, e.g. standard errors, to the corresponding statistics from the SDC regressions. 25 One caveat to this particular comparison between the model and the data is that we do not calibrate our nancial friction parameter τ , but simply model the aggregate nancial shock as a decline in τ from 0.75 to 0.6, resulting in a 25 percent decline in the maximum debt-to-value ratio of all rms. Both the initial value of τ and its drop determine the DID coe cient βC,F , as can be seen in Figure 4a . It is, however, remarkable that both the data and the model suggest that this DID e ect is driven to roughly the same extent by an increase in the share acquired by domestic rms and a decrease in the share acquired by foreign rms. 26 The reader might notice that the magnitude of the coe cient associated with the foreign dummy βF is clearly negative, in contrast to a near zero coe cient in the data. Our model therefore implies that foreign acquisitions are somewhat smaller than domestic acquisitions during normal times. This is not too surprising because our model assumes that foreign and domestic acquirers only di er in their access to nance. Low-synergy (and hence, small-share) acquisitions are not feasible for domestic, constrained acquirers in our model, even in normal times. One could easily align the model's predicted βF with that found in the data by assuming that foreign and domestic acquirers also vary along other dimensions, such as A cut-o ownership of 50% de nes high-value acquisitions in our baseline regression results reported in columns 1-3, based on the results of Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) . We also report results for an alternative where the cut-o ownership for high-value acquisitions is 100%, that takes into account the industry-level positive correlation between target productivity and the likelihood of 100% acquisitions reported in Alquist et al. (2018) . Accordingly, we re-estimate an alternative of the specication in column 2 with the dependent variable being an indicator that is 1 when 100% of a rm is acquired in an acquisition (column 4 of Panels A and B). Corresponding intensive margins are shown in column 5 using the speci cation in column 3, but using an indicator variable for 100% acquisitions (instead of ≥ 50% acquisitions as in column 3). Overall, both de nitions of high-value acquisitions yield similar results. Our empirical analysis of divestiture decisions utilizes this alternative de nition of a high-value acquisition for reasons that are clari ed in the following section.
Divestiture Rates: Empirical Strategy, Hypotheses and Results
Our model also has predictions on the subsequent resale of acquisitions. To remind the reader, Proposition 2 looked at the di erential e ect of a nancial shock on the divestiture rates of constrained domestic and unconstrained foreign acquisitions. The motivation for focussing on the di erential is the same as that for the acquired share, which is that a DID procedure is better able to isolate the e ects of acquirer nancial constraints. In particular, Proposition 2 predicted that the di erential ip rate ("constrained" minus "unconstrained") would decline. To test Proposition 2 empirically, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model of the following form:
where D ct C , D kjct F and the controls are de ned as in the previous section. 27 The estimated hazard function, h jc (τ ), is the probability density that the average rm experiences an acquisition event in a small interval of time ∆τ , conditional on it not having been the target of an acquisition for τ units of time since the last acquisition event (see Kalb eisch and Prentice, 1980 , for details of the notation).
We stratify this baseline hazard h jc (τ ) at the country×target-industry level (i.e., allowed to be di erent across countries indexed c and industries indexed j), to be consistent with the country×targetindustry xed e ects in the regression analysis of acquired shares. The purpose of the strati cation is to take into account divestiture patterns that might be unique to certain countries and industries, say due to regulations.
For our baseline estimations, the duration τ of an acquisition is measured as follows. We identify target rms that appear at least twice in our data. Let such a target rm be indexed by k. The rst transaction involving k identi es the beginning of the relationship between the rst acquirer and the target. The second transaction involving k is assumed to mark the end of the immediately in the distribution of synergy parameters. This modi cation, however, would have little e ect on the model's predictions about our main coe cient of interest, βC,F . 27 The Cox model is a semi-parametric model where the baseline hazard is non-parametric (and in our case di erent in each country-sector) while the estimated log hazard rate is assumed to be log-linearly related to the covariates. In other words, each baseline log hazard function is shifted by the same magnitude by changes in given covariates. preceding ownership relationship, and so on for subsequent appearances by the same target k in the data. 28 The duration of acquisitions involving target k is then de ned as the distance in time between each transaction involving k. While this scheme has the serious limitation that an acquisition event involving k always assumes the seller of the stake to be the previous acquiring rm (which may not be the case due to partial ownership), it has two advantages. First, it lets us keep the same sample of rms for which we estimated our ownership regressions. Second, it makes the performance of the theoretical model easier to compare to the data for reasons that are explained later. However, we also use an alternative scheme that is immune to the issue described above as a robustness check.
In the model above, the hazard ratio
is the ratio between the hazard rate when the covariates take values summarized by the vector X, and the baseline hazard. Our main hypothesis from Proposition 2 is that the crisis e ect should lead to a relative decline of ipping rates of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions, or a relative increase in the ipping rates of foreign cohort. That is, the coe cient β C,F in 3.6 should be positive.
Hypothesis 2 Financial crises have di erential e ects on ip rates of the crisis cohort of domestic and foreign acquisitions. Speci cally, the di erential ip rate for the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions will decline, i.e., β C,F > 0. Equivalently, the exponentiated coe cient, which shows the di erential e ect in percentage terms should be greater than unity, i.e., e β C,F > 1.
The results of estimating equation 3.6 are shown in column 1 of Table 3 . For ease of exposition the table displays the exponent of the coe cient, e.g. e β C,F instead of β C,F . 29 Values above one then indicate an increase in the hazard rate, and values below one indicate a decrease in the hazard.
We nd evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2: The point estimate of the hazard ratio corresponding to the coe cient e β C,F is 1.31, signi cant at 5%. This implies that the e ect of the crisis on the ipping rates of the crisis cohorts of domestic and foreign acquisitions are statistically di erent, in the direction predicted by the theory. The subsequent ip rate for foreign acquisitions undertaken during crises goes up by e β C,F − 1 ×100 = 31% compared to the ip rate for domestic acquisitions.
To better understand this empirical result we turn again to Proposition 2, which decomposed the 28 Our data does not allow us to identify the direct seller of a share in a transaction. 29 To elaborate, the model in equation 3.6 can be expressed in terms of hazard ratios as h kjc (τ |·) =
+controls c,t−4 βmc+ kjct by exponentiating both sides. Keeping the error term and all control variables xed at 0 to ease exposition, the baseline hazard hjc(τ ) is the hazard rate (h.r.) for the normal cohort of domestic acquisitions; the h.r. of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions is hjc(τ )e β C ; the h.r. for the normal cohort of foreign acquisitions is hjc(τ )e β F ; and the h.r. for the crisis cohort of foreign acquisitions is hjc(τ )e β C +β F +β C,F . Hence the di erence in the crisis e ect between foreign and domestic acquisitions (i.e., the DID e ect) is = e β C,F in proportional terms, which is hypothesized to be greater than 1. See Table B .9 in the appendix that displays the regression coe cients associated with the hazard ratios in Table 3 . -20,336.8 -19,414.8 -19,413.7 Log L -7,117.0 -6,630.9 -6,629.7 Notes: (6), correspond respectively to regression equations 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9 in the text, exponentiated to express them in terms of hazard ratios. The baseline hazards are strati ed by country×target-industry. The dates for the domestic banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia (2010) . a, b
and c indicate statistical signi cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the level of country×target-industry are reported in parentheses. All columns include macroeconomic controls whose coe cient estimates are omitted from the table to conserve space.
di erential e ect of the crisis in ipping rates as follows,
into changes of the "normal" and "forced" ip rates for domestic acquirers, and the change in the "normal" ip rate for foreign acquirers. Proposition 2 predicted that there is no change in the proportion of normal ips for domestic acquirers (since there is no change in the proportion of low-value domestic acquisitions) under particular assumptions about the distribution of synergies and nancial liquidity. At the same time it predicted that the di erential (foreign -domestic) ip rate would increase, driven by the decline of domestic forced ips and the increase of foreign normal ips.
First, we establish whether the behavior of domestic or foreign ips drives the empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 2. In terms of the Cox regression hazard ratios in Table 3 , a decline in the ip rate of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions would imply a corresponding hazard ratio of e β C < 1, and an increase in the ip rate of the crisis cohort of foreign acquisitions would imply e β C +β C,F > 1. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that e β C = 0.81, statistically signi cant at the 5% level, meaning that the subsequent ip rates of domestic acquisitions are lower by (1 − e β C ) × 100 = 19% when conducted during crises. At the same time e β C +β C,F = 1.06, which suggests that the ip rate for foreign acquisitions do increase as predicted by the theory. But the change is small, about (1 − e β C +β C,F ) × 100 = 6%, and not statistically signi cant. 30 Hence, we conclude that the empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 2 is driven mostly by a decline in the average ip rates of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions.
The estimated hazard ratios in Table 3 Recall that Figure 5 in the simulation section displayed ipping rates for constrained and unconstrained acquirers as a function of the borrowing constraint parameter, τ . The crisis was modelled as a change in this parameter from 0.75 to 0.6, and then reversion to its normal value of 0.75 after the crisis. For the chosen parameters, the simulations of the model predicted an increase of the ipping rates for unconstrained acquirers by 6 percentage points from 11.5% to 17.2%, and a decrease Next, we ask whether it is changes in normal ips or changes in forced ips that drive the 19% decline in domestic divestiture rates found in column 1. From the decomposition in equation 3.7, it can be seen that lower ipping for constrained domestic acquirers can be in principle due to fewer normal ips driven by a compositional shift towards high-value acquisitions (though under the dis-tributional assumptions in Proposition 2 this change is 0), as well as fewer liquidity-based forced ips. We attempt to disentangle these two channels by using a majority acquisition as the empirical counterpart for a high-value acquisition, as in our baseline estimates for ownership acquired. 31 The idea is to control in regression 3.6 for the compositional shift towards high-value acquisitions. If our estimate of the hazard ratio e β C remains una ected by this control, we interpret this as evidence that part of the reducing ipping rate is driven by fewer forced ips. Accordingly, we add to the model of equation 3.6 a dummy independent variable D kjct 50% indicating whether a transaction resulted in majority ownership:
The results of estimating equation 3.8 are shown in column 2 of Table 3 . We nd evidence that the decline in the ipping rate for domestic acquirers is driven by both a decline in forced ips and a decline in normal ips. First, though the hazard ratio e β C in column 2 declines somewhat in magnitude (indicating a 16% decline in domestic ip rates, as opposed to 19% in column 1), it remains statistically signi cant at 10%. Thus, to the extent that the full ownership dummy proxies for high-value acquisitions, controlling for the compositional shift towards high value acquisition keeps our qualitative results unchanged. Through the lens of our theoretical model, we interpret this result as evidence that there are fewer liquidity-based forced ips for the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions. Second, part of the decline in the ipping rates can be explained by a compositional shift. The highly statistically signi cant hazard ratio associated with D kjct 50% in column 2 shows that majority acquisitions indeed have lower divestiture rates (77% lower on average), consistent with the behavior of high-value acquisitions in the model. This result, coupled with our earlier nding that there is an extensive margin shift towards full acquisitions for domestic acquirers (column 4 of Table   2 ), suggests that part of the lower divestiture rate identi ed in column 1 of Table 3 is driven by the rst channel in the model, which is, a decline in normal ips due to a shift towards high-value acquisitions that are less likely to be divested. Thus, we nd evidence that both channels in equation 3.7 lead to a decline in ips in the cohort of domestic crisis-time acquisitions. 32 To summarize our empirical results, we nd strong empirical support for our predictions regarding the fraction of a rm acquired. Speci cally, we nd that nancially constrained domestic rms in the crisis-hit country acquire between 11-15% more ownership and are 15-18% more likely to take majority stakes than their unconstrained foreign counterparts (see our earlier calculations based on columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Tables 2 and B.1). Such ownership is also more likely to be persistent: the survival rate of a domestic acquisition is between 19-24% higher in the crisis cohort (from the exponentiated coe cient e β C in columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 ). Thus the evidence on divestiture rates is also consistent with our theoretical predictions, though statistically weaker for certain speci cations, 31 As explained earlier, this builds on the idea in Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) that majority acquisitions create real value gains in emerging markets for both domestic and foreign acquirers. 32 The magnitudes of the hazard ratios e β F in the second row of Table 3 , columns 1 and 2 (0.90 and 0.85, respectively), are also consistent with the predictions of our model. They indicate that foreign acquisitions completed in normal times have lower divestiture rates than domestic ones, as shown in Figure 5 . and generally favors the mechanisms highlighted by the model.
Robustness Checks
Longer sample : As explained earlier, we excluded the post-2007 period since the Great Recession in our baseline regressions because foreign rms from developed markets might have been nancially constrained during the Great Recession. Table B .3 in the appendix compares these baseline results (Table B .3, Panel B, which is the same as Panel A of Table 2 ) to those obtained from the full sample spanning 1990-2014 (Table B .3, Panel A). All our main conclusions remain unchanged while the estimated magnitudes of the e ects of interest are slightly larger than in the baseline.
Non-linear estimation: Table B .2 in the appendix shows that the baseline OLS results on shares acquired are robust to estimation using a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). The GLM estimation explicitly accounts for the fact the share acquired, as well as the extensive margin probability, are bounded between 0 and 1.
Di erent xed e ects: We further verify (see Table B .1 in the appendix) that the baseline results with macro controls, and target country×industry xed e ects are robust to having di erent xed e ect constellations, namely: (i) no xed e ects or macro controls; (ii) macro controls and target country xed e ects; (iii) macro controls, target country, and target industry xed e ects; and (iv) macro controls, target country, and acquirer industry xed e ects. These di erent speci cations control for factors that are discussed below.
Controlling for other determinants: Our baseline regressions control for a number of determinants of acquisitions that have been identi ed in the literature. It has been shown in the literature that there is normal business cycle variation in M&As as well as longer-term e ects of the general level of development of an economy. Thus, all the regressions with acquired shares as dependent variable, as well as the duration analysis, use the following macroeconomic controls. Real GDP growth (annual) is used to proxy for the business cycle and real GDP per capita (annual) to control for the level of development of the target country. The nominal exchange rate (quarterly) is included to control for the e ect of exchange rates on the value of collateral as in Froot (1991) and the use of IMF credit and loans as a percentage of a country's quota (quarterly) to account for stress factors in the balance of payments. 33 Alquist et al. (2018) nd that the external nance dependence of target sectors is a secular determinant of the likelihood of foreign acquisitions and the ownership structures chosen by these acquirers. All our benchmark speci cations include SIC single-digit target-industry×target-country xed e ects to control for such target sector speci c e ects. Note that this xed e ect speci cation would also account for di erences from the targets being from speci c sectors, such as the nancial sector.
Controlling for di ering motives for domestic and foreign acquirers: Zhu, Jog and Otchere (2011) nd evidence that rms in EMEs acquire partial stakes in other domestic rms to gain corporate control, while foreign rms use acquisitions as a strategic tool to enter foreign markets. We control for these possible dynamic di erences in motives by controlling for preexisting partial ownership (at the time of an acquisition) of the acquiring rm in the target rm. These results are shown in Table B .4 in the appendix. The table shows that acquirers are likely to acquire smaller stakes when they already own a stake in rm. However, controlling for pre-existing ownership keeps our results unchanged qualitatively. A large literature has recently analyzed the unique characteristics of banking sector acquisitions (see Yorulmazer, 2011a, 2008; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2007 , for example) that are driven by the relative opacity of their assets, and the non-pledgable nature of some of their intangible capital (such as customer relationships). Since these characteristics are likely to di er among foreign and domestic acquiring banks, our results might be mainly driven by changes in the importance of nancial sector acquisitions during crises. While our acquirer-industry xed e ect speci cation above should control for the acquirer being from the nancial sector, we also include an indicator variable control in our baseline speci cation for transactions where both acquirer and target are from the nancial sector. These additional controls leaves our results unchanged (see Tables B.1, B.5 and B.6 in the appendix). Thus the features we uncover appear to be valid both for nancial and non-nancial sector acquisitions.
Alternative crisis de nitions: We also use an alternative proxy for an aggregate nancial shock, making use of the annual banking crisis dates from Reinhart and Rogo (2009) instead of our baseline dating scheme from Laeven and Valencia (2010) . These results are shown in Table B .8 in the appendix. In addition, Table B .7 in the appendix estimates our baseline regressions using only the sample of countries that experienced at least one crisis during 1990-2007 according to Laeven and Valencia (2010) , i.e. excluding Chile, Peru, Singapore and South Africa. Our results are insensitive to these alternatives.
Sectoral composition of acquisitions and sectoral heterogeneity in the crisis e ect: Since our results are averages over several sectors, they could be rationalized if, during crises, domestic acquirers acquire more often in sectors where acquisitions typically involve larger or controlling stakes, while foreign acquirers do the opposite. Thus a possibility we explore is whether our results are driven by changes in the industry composition of acquisitions during crises. The results of this analysis are reported and discussed in the appendix Section B.1. In summary, we nd that changes in the sectoral composition of acquisitions are responsible for at least part of the aggregate e ects we nd in Table 2 . Note that such sectoral composition e ects are not ruled out by our theory, the salient feature of which is to posit the existence of general compositional e ects without positing where such e ects might originate.
Our model is aggregate and as such does not have any implications for sectoral variation in the total crisis e ect or the di erent margins. While our baseline results control for heterogeneity across industries using xed e ects, this does not allow for heterogeneity in the crisis e ect. In order to check if the results in Table 2 hold within each industry as well, Section B.1 reports and discusses the results of an analysis of the crisis e ect across di erent industries. We nd that the direction of the crisis e ects across domestic and foreign acquisitions are broadly consistent with our theory. A large majority of sectors for domestic acquisitions show an increase in shares acquired and majority acquisitions, while the opposite is true for foreign acquisitions. However, the magnitudes and statistical signi cance of the coe cients paint a picture of wide heterogeneity in e ects across sectors.
For example, it appears that Mining and Construction, Wholesale and Retail, and Services (education, legal, other) do not contribute notably to the aggregate e ects for domestic acquisitions, while the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, and the two Services sectors are the most important for foreign acquisitions. In summary, we nd evidence consistent with our aggregate results for acquired shares being driven both by between-sector compositional e ects, as well as within sector changes along the di erent margins.
Assumption about high-value acquisitions in the Cox model: An implication of the model's assumption that high-value acquisitions by constrained domestic and unconstrained foreign acquirers were fundamentally similar was that the low ip rates of high-value acquisitions should not di er across these two types of acquisitions, nor be in uenced by the crisis itself. To test whether these assumptions hold in the data we augment the Cox model in equation 3.8 with interaction terms between D kjct 50% (or D kjct 100% for the alternative scheme described above), D ct C and D kjct F :
+ controls c,t−4 β mc + interaction terms + kjct .
( 3.9) where the vector of interaction terms comprises D ct C × D kjct 50% , D kjct F × D kjct 50% and D ct C × D kjct F × D kjct 50% . The results of estimating the hazard ratios from the model above are shown in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 (corresponding coe cients are reported in Table B .9 in the appendix). The additional hazard ratios associated with the interaction terms of D kjct 50% (D kjct 100% ) in column 3 (column 6) are statistically indistinguishable from unity (i.e., the corresponding coe cients are statistically indistinguishable from zero), and the coe cients on D kjct 50% (D kjct 100% ) themselves do not change much across columns 2 and 3 (5 and 6). This shows that 50% (or 100%) acquisitions are less likely to be ipped irrespective of whether they are undertaken in a crisis period, or by a foreign acquirer. In other words, the assumption that high-value acquisitions are similar across domestic and foreign acquirers appears to be borne out by the data.
Conclusion
This paper provides a simple analytical framework for assessing the acquirer-side e ects of adverse aggregate nancial shocks on the market for corporate control. We model two kinds of acquiring rms: those operating under nancial constraints similar to target rms, and those that are nancially unconstrained. We derive two hypotheses stating that nancial crises have opposite e ects on the acquisition behavior of these two groups: Acquisitions undertaken during nancial crises feature smaller shares and are shorter lived for unconstrained acquirers, but are characterized by larger shares and are more persistent for constrained acquirers. Intuitively, nancial crises induce a selection e ect among constrained acquirers with only the acquisitions with the highest synergies being successful, and the most liquid rms acquiring rms completing these acquisitions. Interpreting constrained and unconstrained acquiring rms as domestic and foreign acquirers in a large dataset of emerging market acquisitions spanning the years 1990-2007, we provide evidence of an increase in the relative stakes acquired in domestic acquisitions, as well as a relatively lower divestiture rates domestic acquisitions in the crisis cohort, as predicted by the model. We nd that these empirical results are robust to a battery of checks that include, among others, extending the estimation sample up until 2014, alternative de nitions of aggregate nancial shocks, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables to control for normal business cycle variation in acquisition activity, di erent xed e ects combinations, and non-linear estimation procedures.
Two elements of our theoretical analysis are worth stressing. First, we focus entirely on selection e ects based on synergies and nancial liquidity. While simple and intuitively appealing, our analysis shows that the precise direction and magnitude of such e ects depend on considerations such as the distributions of synergies and productivity. The selection e ect identi ed in the model is a general point, which we then use to explain the speci c di erences between domestic and cross-border acquisitions noted in the introduction, and robustly established in our empirical analysis. Selection based on nancial liquidity of acquirers forms the basis of our ipping results. An additional assumption about the relationship between ownership structures and synergies, which would arise in many models of input provision (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Alquist et al., 2018) , intangible assets (Antràs, 2003; Antràs, Desai and Foley, 2009 ), or agency issues (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b) , and has strong empirical support in EMEs (Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) , forms the logical bridge between selection e ects based on transaction synergies and ownership structures. Our theoretical analysis thus points to one possible explanation for the empirical facts about emerging market M&As.
Second, our contrasting results for constrained (domestic) and unconstrained (foreign) acquisitions highlight the role of rm level borrowing constraints for rm acquisitions, which in our model comprise the only di erence between rms, in determining which nancially constrained rms remain active in the market for corporate control. It should be noted that this is a deliberate modelling choice, and done to demonstrate the e ect we are after -the di erence in the behavior of foreign and domestic rms when the latter are faced by nancial shocks -most cleanly. Thus our results have mostly focussed on the comparative statics of a nancial shock rather than the initial level di erences in the variables of interest (such as shares acquired and divestiture rates), which could be due to di erences in technology between foreign and domestic rms that are explicitly excluded in the model. It is therefore not surprising that our model empirically performs much better in explaining crisis-induced changes in acquired shares and divestiture rather than their levels.
Our model has important macro-economic implications that are worth exploring. For example, the selection e ects described in this paper have direct consequences for an economy's aggregate productivity. Since Joseph Schumpeter's classic work (Schumpeter, 1934) , it is well understood that recessions or nancial crises lead to higher average productivity through a so-called "cleansing" e ect that forces the exit of the least productive rms. Our model suggests that such a cleansing e ect might also be present in the market for corporate control, where it shifts resources towards the most productive M&As. Since these M&As are also shown to be longer lived, these e ects are likely to endure beyond the nancial crisis itself. A careful analysis of these e ects requires a dynamic model and is beyond the scope of this paper, but we already point towards selection e ects that are likely to be critical in such a model.
The model also has a rich set of rm-level predictions regarding the joint distribution of productivity and nancial liquidity for acquirers and targets that we do not test partly because, to the best of our knowledge, high-quality balance sheet data for a large set of acquirers and target rms do not
